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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy Lamont Gray appeals from the order revoking his probation. The district court
decided to revoke probation after conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding Mr. Gray had
violated two conditions of his probation: a rule contained in a document entitled Wisconsin
Rules of Supervision, and a term purportedly contained in an Idaho Department of Correction
Agreement of Supervision.
On appeal, Mr. Gray asserts three alternative grounds for reversing the revocation order:
(1) the district court erred in finding that a probation violation had occurred, because the State
failed to establish that the rules Mr. Gray violated were in fact conditions of Mr. Gray’s
continued probation; (2) the district court’s violated Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) by revoking
probation without an express finding that Mr. Gray’s probation violation was willful; and (3) the
district court erred in finding “good cause” for denying Mr. Gray his right to confront witnesses
and in allowing the State to introduce unreliable documentary and hearsay evidence.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s argument regarding the first ground:
the district court’s erroneous finding that a probation violation occurred. Specifically, this Reply
addresses the State’s failure to introduce any court order, supervision agreement, interstate
compact agreement, or testimony setting forth the conditions of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation.
Contrary to the State’s assertions, there are no “missing portions of the appellate record” and
there is no legal “presumption” that operates to rectify the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the probation violations found by the district court. The order revoking Mr. Gray’s
probation should be reversed. Mr. Gray’s probation should be reinstated.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gray’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Should the revocation order be reversed, because the State failed to carry its burden of
proving that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his probation?

II.

Should the revocation order be reversed, because the district court erroneously revoked
Mr. Gray’s probation without expressly finding that Mr. Gray’s probation violation was
“willful”?

III.

Should the order revoking probation be reversed, because the evidence used to support
the finding of the violation was admitted in violation of Mr. Gray’s due process right to
confront and cross examine adverse witnesses?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Revocation Order Should Be Reversed Because The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of
Proving That Mr. Gray Violated A Condition Of His Probation

A.

Introduction
The district court revoked Mr. Gray’s probation based on its findings that Mr. Gray

violated two rules: Wisconsin Rule of Supervision ST 001; and IDOC Rule 12. (Tr., p.45, L.5 –
p.46, L.12.) As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, the State failed to establish that either rule was
a condition of Mr. Gray’s continued Idaho probation, and therefore the violations found by the
district court cannot support its decision to revoke Mr. Gray’s probation. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.12-16.)
The State does not dispute that Mr. Gray’s due process rights entitled him to an
evidentiary hearing that required the State to prove the existence of the conditions of probation
that Mr. Gray allegedly violated. (See generally, Resp.Br.) The State admits that it failed to
introduce any court order of probation, Idaho Department of Correction Supervision Agreement,
Interstate Compact Agreement, or other agreement that set forth the specific conditions of
Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation, during the evidentiary hearing. (Resp.Br., pp.6-10.) The State also
admits it failed to introduce any testimony that identified or established the specific conditions of
Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation. (Resp.Br., p.9 n.3.) Yet the State does not concede there was
insufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings that Mr. Gray violated the conditions
of his Idaho probation.
Instead, and rather astoundingly, the State argues that its failure to introduce proof
actually operates to support the district court findings, citing the “presumption of regularity,” and
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the rule that “missing portions of the appellate record are presumed to support the actions of the
trial court.” (Resp.Br., pp.8-10.) According to the State’s argument, it is because the State did
not introduce the specific conditions of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation that a “presumption of
regularity” applied to allow the district court to “infer” the specific terms necessary for the
district court to find the probation violations that it found. (Resp.Br., p.8.) Specifically, the
State argues that, because Mr. Gray’s “judgment of conviction and order of probation” includes a
reference to an “attached” IDOC Agreement – and despite the fact that neither of these
documents was introduced at Mr. Gray’s probation revocation proceedings – the IDOC
Agreement, which must “exist” somewhere, should be deemed a “missing portion of the
appellate record” and “presumed to support the actions of the trial court.” (Resp.Br., p.8.) The
State’s argument is absurd and for the reasons herein should be rejected.
B.

The Legal Presumptions Cited By The State Do Not Apply In This Appeal And Do Not
Remedy The State’s Failure To Introduce Evidence
As a preliminary matter, and contrary to the State’s suggestion, there are no “missing

portions of the appellate record” in this appeal. This is an appeal from the order revoking
Mr. Gray’s probation following his evidentiary and disposition hearings. (R., pp.163, 166.) This
appellate record contains the complete transcript of Mr. Gray’s probation revocation proceedings
held before the district court, including the transcript of the district court’s rulings and decisions
(Tr., pp.5-58); copies of all the exhibits admitted at these hearings (Exhibits, pp.261-276); and
copies the court’s orders issued and filed as the result of those proceedings (R. pp.96-170).
As the State admits, it never introduced the “IDOC Agreement,” or the “judgment of
conviction and order of probation” to which that IDOC Agreement was purportedly “attached”
(Resp. Br., pp.3, 9 n.3), and notably, the district court did not take judicial notice of either item
(see generally Tr., pp.5-58). Thus, all of the evidence and arguments presented to the district
5

court for its probation revocation decision are included in the appellate record, and that record is
therefore sufficient for this Court’s review of the district court’s factual findings. State v. Easley,
156 Idaho 214, 218 (2014).
1.

The “Presumption Of Regularity” Cannot Not Save Clearly Erroneous Findings
That Are Not Supported By Substantial Competent Evidence

There is no “presumption of regularity” that relieved the State of its burden to establish
the specific probation conditions the State alleged Mr. Gray violated. The State acknowledges
Mr. Gray had the constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing at which the State bore the burden
of proving that a probation violation occurred (Resp.Br., p.7), and the State does not dispute that
its burden included proving the existence of the probation conditions allegedly violated (see
generally, Resp.Br). (See also Appellant’s Brief, pp.14-16 (citing State v. Klinger, 143 Idaho
493, 496 (2006) (holding that conditions of probation cannot be implied but must be
established); State v. Santana, 79 Idaho 79, 83 (Ct. App. 2017) (same), and State v. Gomez, 153
Idaho 253, 257 (2012) (“burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is
upon the plaintiff”)).

A “presumption of regularity” is not a substitute for the substantial

evidence that is required to uphold a factual finding challenged on appeal. See State v. Rose, 144
Idaho 762, 765 (2007) (stating that a finding of probation violation will be upheld on appeal if
supported by substantial evidence). As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, the probation violations
found by the district court are not supported by evidence in the record and therefore cannot be
used to support the district court’s decision to revoke Mr. Gray’s probation.

(Appellant’s

Br., pp.7-16.)
Furthermore, and as conceded by the State on appeal, at the evidentiary hearing the State
failed to introduce the “judgment of conviction and order of probation” that purports to make
specific conditions of an attached Idaho Department of Correction Supervision Agreement part
6

of Mr. Gray’s probation. (Resp.Br., p.9 note.3; see generally Exhibits; Tr., pp.5-48.) Without
submitting that item into evidence, the State failed to provide substantial evidence from which
the district court could “presume” or “infer” any other facts, including the specific conditions of
Mr. Gray’s probation. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, and argued in the Appellant’s
Brief, conditions of probation cannot be implied but must be established. (Appellant’s Br., p.14
(citing State v. Klinger, 143 Idaho 493, 496 (2006)). For this reason, the State’s argument should
be rejected.
Even if the judgment of conviction and order of probation had been introduced or
considered by the district court as evidence at the revocation hearing, that document would
establish no more than that Mr. Gray was ordered to obey the conditions of a particular
supervision agreement.

(See Resp.Br., p.8.)

Even then, the document would provide no

evidentiary basis from which the district court could identify the specific conditions set forth in
that supervision agreement. The State bore the burden to identify the conditions of Mr. Gray’s
probation but the State failed to introduce any evidence to satisfy that burden. The State’s
“presumption” arguments improperly shift the burden to Mr. Gray to introduce evidence to
identify his probation conditions. However, there is no presumption of regularity that operates
here to save findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.
2.

The Allegations In The Report of Violation Do Not Constitute Substantial
Evidence That Supports The District Court’s Finding

The State also argues that, because the allegations in the Report of Violation are signed
and sworn to by a Senior Idaho Probation/Parole Officer, those allegations constitute substantial
competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that IDOC Rule 12 was a condition of
Mr. Gray’s probation. (Resp.Br., p.10.) However, the statements in the Report of Violation fall
critically short of claiming that the language of the rules allegedly violated were included in any
7

agreement entered by or between Mr. Gray and the Idaho Department of Correction, or were
otherwise conditions of Mr. Gray’s probation.

While the State asserts that the Report of

Violation “quotes from several terms of the IDOC Agreement of Supervision” (Resp.Br., p.10
(emphasis added)), that is not an accurate description of the Report of Violation. As noted in the
Appellant’s Brief, nowhere in the Report of Violation does its author identify the rules it sets
forth as being “terms” as being part of any IDOC agreement entered into by or between
Mr. Gray and the Idaho Department of Correction, or among the specific conditions originally
ordered by the court. (Appellant’s Br., p.15 n.8; Exhibits, pp.26-63 (Ex.A).) Moreover, the
author nowhere claims to have personal knowledge of the specific conditions Mr. Gray’s
probation, nor does he claim to have reviewed any files or documents containing the terms or
conditions of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation. (See generally Exhibits, pp.26-63 (Ex.A).)

Thus,

contrary to the State’s suggestion (Resp.Br. p.10), the allegations in the Report of Violation are
not the same as, and cannot substitute for, the testimony of a probation officer having personal
knowledge of the actual terms and conditions of Mr. Gray’s probation, setting forth those terms
and conditions at a probation revocation hearing. The State acknowledges there was no such
testimony offered at Mr. Gray’s hearing. (Resp.Br. p.9, n.3.)
3.

The State Failed To Establish That Wisconsin Rule ST 001 Was A Condition Of
Mr. Gray’s Idaho Probation

The State argues that, notwithstanding its failure to introduce any Idaho order or Idaho
agreement containing the terms or conditions of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation, and
notwithstanding its failure to introduce the terms of the purported interstate compact agreement,
the district court nonetheless properly found that the conditions of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation
included Wisconsin Rule ST 001. (Resp.Br., p.8-10.) According to the State’s argument,
because the terms of the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision contain a term that required compliance
8

with the IDOC Standard Agreement (Exhibit B), and because Mr. Gray was returned to Idaho for
allegedly violating different terms of the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision (Exhibit H), the district
court could reasonably infer an “inescapable link” between Gray’s Idaho probation and his
supervision in Wisconsin, and based on such “inescapable link,” make the finding that violating
any Wisconsin Rule of Supervision was a violation of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation.
(Resp.Br., pp.9-10.) The State’s reasoning is flawed and its argument should be rejected.
Exhibit B, the “Wisconsin Rules of Supervision,” contain the conditions governing
Mr. Gray’s supervision in Wisconsin, by the Wisconsin Department of Correction. (Exhibits,
pp.264-65 (Ex.B)..) That those rules included a term requiring compliance with the terms of an
IDOC agreement does nothing to define the conditions of Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation.
Exhibit H, the Notice of Interstate Compact Probable Cause Hearing, reflects simply that
Mr. Gray was “retaken” for allegedly violating specific terms of the Wisconsin Rules of
Supervision. (Exhibits, pp.275-76 (Ex.H).) There is absolutely nothing within Exhibit H that
defines Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation to include a violation of the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision.
(Exhibits, pp.275-76 (Ex.H).) Contrary to the State’s argument, these documents to not give rise
to some “inescapable link” between Mr. Gray’s supervision in Wisconsin and the conditions of
his Idaho probation that would support a finding that the violation of Wisconsin Rule of
Supervision was also a violation Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation.
Therefore, and as argued in the Appellant’s Brief, because there is no substantial
evidence in the record that establish Wisconsin Rule of Supervision ST 001 to be a condition of
Mr. Gray’s Idaho probation, the district court finding that the Wisconsin rule was violated cannot
provide a basis for its decision to revoke Mr. Gray’s probation. (Appellant’s Br., pp.14-15.)
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C.

The State’s Remaining Arguments Regarding Its Failure To Prove That Mr. Gray
Violated A Condition Of His Probation Are Unremarkable
The State’s remaining arguments regarding its failure to prove that Mr. Gray violated a

condition of his probation are unremarkable, and Mr. Gray respectfully refers this Court to his
arguments in Section I of the Appellant’s Brief as his arguments in reply.

II.
The District Court Erroneously Revoked Mr. Gray’s Probation Without Expressly Finding That
Mr. Gray’s Probation Violation Was “Willful”
As set forth in the Section II of the Appellant’s Brief, the district court in this case failed
to articulate any finding that Mr. Gray’s probation violation was willful, in violation of Idaho
Criminal Rule 33(f), and Mr. Gray’s due process rights as a probationer to “written findings,”
and the decision to revoke Mr. Gray’s probation must therefore be vacated as an abuse of
discretion. (Appellant’s Br., pp.20-23.)
As to the State’s claim that Mr. Gray’s argument is not preserved for review
(Resp.Br., p.15), Mr. Gray refers this Court to its decision in State v. Clausen, 163 Idaho 180,
183 (Ct. App. 2017). In Clausen, Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the
discretionary decision to revoke probation should be reviewed for fundamental error, and
concluded that the abuse-of-discretion standard is the standard of review that applies. Id. That is
the standard under which Mr. Gray argues this issue in the Appellant’s Brief. (See Appellant’s
Br., p.21.)
As to the State’s argument that no actual finding is required so long as there is substantial
evidence in the record to support an implicit finding (Resp.Br., p.16), Mr. Gray respectfully
refers this Court to his arguments in Appellant’s Brief as this reply, noting especially that the
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State has failed to address his argument1 that an express finding on the record is necessary to
comply with Mr. Gray’s due process rights as a probationer under Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782 (1973). (Appellant’s Br., p.23.)

III.
The Order Revoking Probation Should Be Reversed Because The Evidence Used To Support
The Finding Of The Violation Was Admitted In Violation Of Mr. Gray’s Due Process Right To
Confront And Cross Examine Adverse Witnesses
In Section III of the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gray asserts that his right to confront was
violated because the district court allowed the State to prove its case using documentary and
hearsay evidence without permitting Mr. Gray the opportunity to confront the witnesses, despite
the objections of his attorney. (Appellant’s Br., pp.24-28). Mr. Gray claims the district court
clearly erred in its finding that he entered an interstate compact agreement which waived his
rights to confront and his right to challenge the reliability documentary evidence. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.24-27.) Mr. Gray also challenged the district court’s finding of “good cause” for denying
Mr. Gray his confrontation rights based on the distance between the states.

(Appellant’s

Br., pp.27-28.)
The State’s arguments in its Respondent’s Brief, at pages 18-23, are unremarkable and
Mr. Gray respectfully refers this Court to the arguments in his Appellant’s Brief as his arguments
in reply.

1

In Clausen, the Court of Appeals noted but did not address this argument because it was made
for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief. 163 Idaho at 183. The issue is properly presented
in Mr. Gray’s Appellant’s Brief. (Appellant’s Br., p.23.)
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, and those herein, Mr. Gray respectfully
asks this Court to reverse the order revoking his probation and executing his sentence, and
remand his case to the district court with the instruction that his probation be reinstated.
Alternatively, Mr. Gray asks for a new probation revocation evidentiary hearing that complies
with his due process rights, including his right to confront.
DATED this 7th day of August, 2020.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of August, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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